Greek Political Theory: Plato and His Predecessors. by Ernest Barker
Review by: A. E. Taylor
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Mind Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2249117
Accessed: 21/06/2014 13:08
'rise up' into consciousness and are 'pressed down' is, of course, metaphorical. But the metaphor does express certain observable facts which it is easy to indicate and difficult to analyse. An example is the curious way in which one seems to know a name that one is trying vainly to recall, and can tell perhaps how many syllables it has or that it does not begin with some suggested letter. I think that the threshold theory regards such experiences as being on the borderline of the conscious and the unconscious, and as giving an indication of what the unconscious may be like. I cannot attempt to analyse such experiences here and now; but I am inclined to think that a complete theory of the phenomena with which Freudians deal needs factors both from the Introspection Theory and from the Threshold Theory. I seem to be able to detect repressions in my own mental life, and they always seem to involve (i) a diversion of attention from certain objects, and (ii) at the same time a vague cognition of those objects in the sense of the Threshold Theory.

I must close this too long review by saying that Dr. Jones's book (in spite of some exaggerations, incident to his enthusiasm for his subject, which may 'evolve a smile in the young or a blush in the fair') seems to me to form an excellent introduction to psycho-analysis, and that it has persuaded me that no psychologist can safely neglect the Freudian school, whether he likes their conclusions or not.

C. D. Broad.


Though Mr. Barker's work is, in a way, an expansion of part of a volume published as long ago as 1906, the process of revision and expansion has been so thorough that no apology need be made for treating the result as to all intents and purposes a new book. As such I hope I may be allowed to give it a very hearty welcome. I do not think it any exaggeration to say that Mr. Barker has written by far the best work yet in existence on the social and political side of Plato's philosophy, and that every reader will wait impatiently for the companion volume dealing with Aristotle and his successors. It is to be hoped that "the position of national affairs" will not delay the completion of Mr. Barker's labour of love very long. The great positive merit of Mr. Barker's treatment of his subject is that he has at last given us a work on Plato in which the Laws, far the most splendid and fruitful of all ancient contributions to the study of conduct, education, and social organisation, is adequately recognised and utilised as it deserves to be. The silly notion that Plato's Laws is a second-rate work, exhibiting symptoms of senile aberration which make it almost negligible to the student of Platonic philosophy, if it still survives anywhere, ought to receive its coup de
grace from the chapters in which Mr. Barker studies successively the general social and political theory of the book which Plato evidently designed to be his magnum opus, and its contributions to jurisprudence and the theory of education. As Mr. Barker is a philosophical tutor in Oxford, it is perhaps permissible to express a hope that his book may come to be regularly read for "Greats" and may put an end to the scandalous practice of keeping the Oxford Honours student, who is supposed to make Plato the foundation of his reading in ethics and politics, wholly ignorant of Plato's final and matured judgments on the deepest issues of practical philosophy. Mr. Barker has done specially well to append to his chapters on the Laws an excursus calling attention to the almost servile dependence of Aristotle's overrated lectures on Politics upon the greater work of Aristotle's greater teacher. I could only wish that Mr. Barker had allowed himself in this connexion to discuss the kindred point of the sources of Aristotle's ethics. It would have been easy to show that the Aristotelian Ethics is just as dependent as the Aristotelian Politics on the Laws and the Politicus, and that in respect of many things which are quite commonly treated by writers who should know better as "improvements" on the Academic doctrine. It cannot too often be repeated that Aristotle was not, as I used to be told (though I always took the liberty to doubt it), in my undergraduate days, a practical thinker bent on curbing the speculative extravagances of idéologues. The real truth is that it was Plato and the Academy who were the practical politicians, Aristotle who was (naturally enough in a man who was all his life an étholos), the idéologue. What really interested him was not legislation or the expulsion of the Carthaginian barbarian from Sicily or the diffusion of Hellenism over the East, but "theology" and cosmology. His Ethics, in particular, contains not one single thought which is not a mere reproduction of something to be found in the Politicus, Philebus, or Laws. In particular, the common notion that Aristotle somehow corrected the "one-sidedness" of the Socratic and Platonic doctrine that virtue is knowledge is due simply to ignorance. Better acquaintance with the way in which this famous (and true) doctrine is presented in the Laws is enough to show that there is not really a shade of difference on the point between Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. Indeed no Greek moralist ever dreamed of denying that virtue is knowledge of the good, and that men only pursue "unreal" good because they mistakenly suppose it to be real. (Official Christianity, of course, maintains the same thing to the present day, when it ascribes the choice of evil to the "deceits of the world, the flesh, and the devil".)

My only criticism of the general line of argument in Mr. Barker's book would be that it is so good that it might easily have been better still. I mean that his appreciation of the importance of the Politicus and Laws is so sound that it should have led him a little further. He still, in my opinion, attaches an undue philosophical importance to the positions of the Republic, though he has less excuse for doing so than students of Plato who have fallen into mistakes
he avoids. He sees, in my opinion quite rightly, that the Republic is, comparatively speaking, an early work which must have been completed by the time Plato was forty, and that we have to allow for a preponderance of the dramatic over the philosophic in the earlier Platonic writings. Now it is very unusual to find that a philosopher of the first order whose life is prolonged as Plato’s was reaches his most important results by the age of forty. What would be left of the work of Descartes or Kant, for example, if those philosophers had died at forty? Berkeley’s best-known works, indeed, were published at a much earlier age, and Hume’s Treatise was written before the author was twenty-five. But Berkeley’s thought in his youthful works is marked everywhere by a pretty patent want of maturity, and Hume spoiled himself as a philosopher by his neglect to prosecute real metaphysical reflexion after the literary failure of the Treatise. It seems, moreover, rather arbitrary on Mr. Barker’s part, after recognising in principle, as he does, the genuinely Socratic character of Plato’s earlier dialogues, to decide for no apparent reason that the positions taken up by Socrates in the Republic must all be treated as the personal convictions of Plato. One cannot help wondering whether Mr. Barker has not a little illogically shrunk from the consequences of his own admissions, perhaps from an unconscious desire to conciliate the sort of Oxford tutor who objects to what he amusingly calls the “St. Andrews school” because he knows that if they are right he will have to reconstruct his lectures. No one supposes that Plato is personally bound by all he puts into the mouth of Protagoras or Hippias; why should we assume that the case is different in principle with what he puts into the mouth of Socrates? It is different when the speaker is anonymous, like the Eleatic of the Sophistes or the Athenian of the Laws. As these speakers are not put before us as known historical persons, we have not here to reckon with the necessity of making them speak in conformity with their known views and known manner of utterance. They may fairly be taken to commit the author who has made them the leaders in a philosophic discussion, unless he has given positive indications—as Plato has not done—that they are not speaking on his behalf.

My chief reason for dwelling on the point is that I think the assumption that Socrates, in the Republic, = Plato leads Mr. Barker to some misapprehensions on two rather important points. He is very much in earnest with the view that the social scheme of the Republic is one in which Plato, at the age of forty, personally believed in all its details and that Plato seriously proposes it as immediately practicable. I can see no ground for either assumption. Of course Plato must have been at one with the general spirit of the proposals of Socrates in the Republic or he would not have written the dialogue. But this does not warrant our holding that every detail of the programme put forward by Socrates in a dialogue so richly dramatic must have commended itself to Plato, even at the moment of writing. As for the view that the Callipolis is no
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"Utopia," but a scheme intended to be put into practice as it stands, the *Republic* itself seems to me to prove the very opposite. Mr. Barker strangely appeals for proof of his thesis to the passage in which it is proposed by Socrates to get over the difficulty of effecting the "social revolution" by "rusticating" all citizens of more than ten years old and so getting a free hand to work on the rising generation. Surely Mr. Barker has forgotten, as the pedants of whom he is not one regularly do, that there was,"lots of fun in" Socrates. It is just this very passage which, more than any other, *proves* that Socrates himself does not really look upon his Callipolis as a Marxist looks on his "socialistic community".

I think the same unwillingness to recognise the dramatic character of the *Republic* partly accountable for what seems to me Mr. Barker's partial failure to understand the point of the severe satire on δημοκρατία. Mr. Barker, of course, admits that the defects noted by Socrates are defects to which "democracy" is prone, and he has a good deal that is suggestive to say on the other side about ways in which they may be minimised and about the good points in "democracy". I do not myself suppose that Plato at any time of his life would have denied the truth of most of what Mr. Barker urges against him. But he might have said, and with justice, that none of these considerations are in the least germane to his indictment of δημοκρατία in the *Gorgias* and *Republic*. For what is attacked there is a very special and peculiar thing which it would be strange that any philosopher should not oppose. The attack is not on "popular government" as such but on the δημοκρατία of Athens during the Peloponnesian War. Now Mr. Barker seems not to have made it quite clear to himself what the really objectionable feature of this specific "democracy" was. What it was he will see if he asks himself "where did the plenitude of sovereignty reside in the Athenian constitution?" It resided, of course, in the Heliaea, and this is just why Solon who created the Heliaea and Pericles who made them "democratic" by paying the citizen dicasts are always thought of correctly as the two men most directly responsible for the character of the Athenian constitution. The real evil, inseparable from the democracy after Pericles, was that, owing to the rule that an outgoing magistrate must pass his ἕθεα to the satisfaction of a paid popular court, every one who took any part in public life at Athens risked his citizen rights, his property, even his life, if he adopted any measure which might be resented by a popular "jury," who were judges of the law as well as of the fact, had no rigid rules of evidence or procedure, and were to a considerable extent also free to determine the penalty in case of conviction without any possibility of having their decision modified by a "prerogative". The terms on which statesmen undertook office in our own country in the reign of Charles II. were bad enough, but never so bad as this. Halifax or Danby or Shaftesbury had always to reckon with the possibility of impeachment, or Bill of Attainder, but even the iniquitous proceedings on Bill of Attainder were not quite so unfair to the politician who had provoked general
animosity as prosecution before an Athenian dicastery, and the royal prerogative could be used to protect the attained from the full fury of his enemies, as it should have been used by Charles I. for Strafford and would probably have been used by William III. for Fenwick but for the folly of Fenwick himself. In fact trial for political short-comings at Athens can only be compared with trial before a "Soviet". Of course so long as a man of the personal qualities of Pericles was at the head of the administration the full iniquity of the system could be undetected, but the history of the Athenian democracy in its behaviour to its public servants under the régime of the vigorous but coarse and brutal "leaders of the δήμος" who succeeded Pericles seems to me to bear out to the full everything which the Republic and Gorgias say about the tendencies of what those dialogues call δημοκρατία, the "sovereignty of the canaille", δημοκρατία with a "fundamental law," such as we read of in the Politics is, of course, a different thing, a form of the "sovereignty of law," and it indicates no change of mind in Plato that he should judge it more favourably. There is no reason to suppose that, to the end of his life, Plato had more than one opinion about δημοκρατία as practised in Athens under the guidance of Cleon or Hyperbolus.

I note one or two other failures of insight in the discussion of the Republic which would not surprise me in most writers about Plato but do surprise me a little in Mr. Barker. I see, for instance, that he is among those who gravely censure the unfeeling harshness of Socrates' observations about valetudinarians. He forgets that the fury of Socrates is part of his humour; he is amusing himself by denouncing the selfish maladie imaginaire much in the style of Dickens's Boythorn, and must not be taken to be much more serious than Boythorn was in his frequent proposals of heroic measures to be taken with bores and nuisances. If Mr. Barker will read and reflect on the Hippocratean περί διαίτης για, he will see that the explanation of the assumption that the "working-man" only puts himself "in the doctor's hands" when things are desperate is simply that in the Socratic age there was an excellent literature of guides to self-regulation in matters of hygiene intended to be used by the very class of persons of whom Plato is speaking. So again I suspect Mr. Barker misses the real point about the "infanticide", in the Republic. Permission to Platonic guardians of over 55, after life-long training in σωφυροτήτα, to enjoy the company of ladies of over 40 who had also been guardians, without State-supervision would not be likely to be abused—(may I protest against the nonsense of Prof. Woodhouse who has just described this permission in vol. x. of Hastings' Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, art. Prostitution (Greek) as license for "promiscuity,") and if it were, would not be very likely to lead to "consequences". Even in our own climate ladies do not commonly have "additions to their families" after the age Plato specifies, and the thing would be more unusual still in a Mediterranean country. Plato obviously means simply to allow the guardians of both sexes the comfort of a
little domesticity in their declining years, a fireside and a companion; the "offspring resulting from the arrangement" may safely be doomed to "exposure," since the chances all are that there never will be any to "expose". The moral character of the parties is one guarantee against abuse of the freedom so tardily granted them, and besides this their age has to be allowed for. If I might mention a few minor points on which I think Mr. Barker might reconsider his views, I should like to suggest that it cannot well be true that Sparta is aimed at in the description of the "oligarchical state" in Republic VIII. The kind of community meant is obviously a great-commercial city in which the merchant-princes control affairs, like Venice or Amsterdam in later times. What particular city Socrates may be supposed to have in mind is not clear,1 but it can hardly be Sparta, which never had either commerce or "merchant-princes". I doubt also whether the account of the "tyrant" owes much to the career of Dionysius I. We must remember that Socrates is supposed to be speaking somewhere about 425 B.C., and it would be an anachronism to put into his mouth expressions which require to be understood in the light of events that only happened long after. So far as I can judge, the "historical allusions" are mainly to the story of Peisistratus. The character of the tyrant, which does not correspond to any estimate Plato is likely to have formed of Dionysius, is shown by comparison with the Gorgias, to be largely reminiscent of the most famous autocrat of Socrates' day, Archelaus (also, I believe, alluded to under the transparent disguise of "Ardiasus the Great" in the "myth of Er").

I am glad to see that Mr. Barker is ready to be convinced about the genuineness of the Epinomis and Epistles. He does not however fully appreciate the importance of the fact that the Epistles were included as a body in the earliest "edition" of Plato known to us, that of Aristophanes of Byzantium. This means that, like the ἔπιστολαι Παύλου, they came into the Canon as a whole, not as separate items. It is uncritical to reason as though we had to regard each "epistle" simply on its own merits. It is the collection as a whole about which we have to decide whether its presence in the "Canon" warrants a belief in its genuineness. If this question can be answered affirmatively, then only the strongest internal evidence of non-Platonic authorship can justify the rejection of any one item. (In my own opinion we have this internal evidence only in the case of Ep. I., but this must be regarded not as a forged "letter of Plato" but as a genuine early fourth-century document connected with Sicilian affairs, and for that reason included from the first in the Platonic correspondence.) As for the Epinomis, I think that if Mr. Barker will go into the facts he will discover that the only person in antiquity who ever doubted its authenticity was Proclus and that Proclus doubted, in defiance of unanimous tradition, on two grounds, one of which is worthless and the other makes very strongly for the dialogue. The modern "athetizers" give no

1 Carthage.
reason at all for their attitude, and I suspect that some of them have not even read what they reject.

I should like to explain what I feel sure is the reason for the selection of 37 as the number of Plato's nocturnal Council. Ritter—pace Mr. Barker—is obviously right in saying that the 37 are 36 + an odd person added to prevent any decision from being carried on an even division of the votes. But why 36 rather than 24 or 48 or any other multiple of 12? Any one conversant with the remains of the Pythagorean arithmetic will see at once that the reason is that 36 = 6² = 1² × 2² × 3² = 1³ + 2³ + 3³. *I.e.,* 36 is not only the "square" of 6, the first "perfect number," but also the product of the three first "squares," and further the sum of the three first "cubes". (This last point was thought to have considerable embryological significance, as may be seen not only from the *Theologumena Arithmetica* but also from the περὶ σαρκῶν of the Hippocratean corpus.) Our information about this number-lore comes primarily, to be sure, from post-Christian Neo-Pythagoreans, but it is really quite easy to prove that the bulk of what they tell us goes back at least to the time of Socrates' friend Philolaus, if not to Pythagoras himself. Plato, as readers of the *Republic* know, had all this at his fingers' ends and liked to play with it in a half-serious fashion. Similarly no Pythagorean or Academic would have found the selection of 5040 as the number of citizens for the colony of the *Laws* as arbitrary as Mr. Barker seems to think it. Speusippus or Philolaus would have thought it obviously right, if you wanted a number with many divisors, to get it by securing one divisible by all the integers ἐντὸς τῆς δεκάδος, which was regarded as the natural "period" in numeration, and to secure this by taking the continued product of the numbers from 1 to 7 (the highest prime number < 10). In point of fact \( \frac{5040}{2} \) or 2520 would also have the property of being divisible by every integer not greater than 10, but Plato, as a mathematician, wants a number which is formed *symmetrically*.

Mr. Barker's humour fails him, for once, over the *Menexenus*; of course the *Menexenus* is genuine. It is simply lack of humour which has led to doubts about it. It is a skit, and a very good one, on professional patriotic oratory, as Sir A. T. Quiller-Couch has recently explained. Germans and persons of the Germanic habit of mind are sadly perplexed by its ludicrous chronological blunders. How could Plato make Socrates talk of the events of 387? In point of fact, he has done worse; it is *Aspasia* whose speech Socrates professes to be repeating, and the supposed date is not long after the famous ἐντάθμωσ of Pericles for the victims of the first year of the Peloponnesian War! Of course this is intentional. The "jelly-bellied flag-flapper" is not usually strong on accurate chronology and it is his style of oratory which is being caricatured. Again, say the Germans, some of the reasons given for being proud,
of your country are quite good, others are quite bad. What can we make of the work if we can neither regard it as all caricature nor as all earnest? If one has an eye for irony one ought to be able to understand without being told that even the "flag-flapper" does mix up some respectable reasons for patriotism with the discreditable ones and that any good caricature of his style of oratory must reproduce and accentuate the mixture. The argument that Athenians ought to make it a reason for admiring themselves that they have always hated the "barbarian" so bitterly is, of course, one of the bad reasons, and it is Plato's characteristic irony to mix it up with worthier topics. Mr. Barker really ought not to have worried himself with the question what light the remark throws on Plato's opinions about "barbarians"; he ought quietly to enjoy the art of the suggestion, as Plato meant he should.

I take it a reference to Samos (!) as the home of Protagoras is a mere slip of the pen, or perhaps the result of an "association by similarity" of the names Protagoras and Pythagoras. It is no doubt also a mere oversight that Zeno's invention of dialectic is ascribed in passing to Protagoras, who, according to Plato, came badly to grief the moment Socrates began to try "dialectic" upon him.

I trust these observations will not be understood as intended to detract in the least from what I have said about the very great excellence of Mr. Barker's fascinating study.

A. E. TAYLOR.

The Individual Delinquent: a textbook of Diagnosis and Prognosis for all concerned in understanding offenders. By WILLIAM HEALY, A.B., M.D., Director of the Psychopathic Institute, Juvenile Court, Chicago; Associate Professor, Mental and Nervous Diseases, Chicago Policlinic. London: Heinemann. Pp. xvii, 830.

It is difficult to speak too highly of this book, and that whether we think of its contents or of its methods of analysis and exposition. It is one of the best of the fine series in which it occurs—the Modern Criminal Science Series, published under the auspices of the American Institute of criminal law and criminology. This series has been devised with the catholic readiness of America in this branch of scientific practice to ascertain direct from the rest of the world what the experts have thought and said. But as one scans the various volumes, for example, Garofalo's Criminology, Tarde's Penal Philosophy, Lombrosó's Crime, its Causes and Remedies, Gross's Criminal Psychology, De Quiros's Modern Theories of Criminology, Saleille's Individualisation of Punishment, one cannot help feeling every here and there that, in criminology as in so many other departments of civil practice, the broad generalities are strained by every ingenuity to cover what the refractory conditions
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